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3 January 1975

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

WORKING GROUP

Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting  
1030 Hours, 29 January 1975  
NSC Conference Room, EOB

Chairman: LTG Samuel V. Wilson, D/DCI/IC

Members present: Mr. Leslie H. Brown, Dept. of State  
(representing Mr. George S. Vest,  
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military  
Affairs)  
Mr. Robert F. Ellsworth, Assistant  
Secretary of Defense (International  
Security Affairs)  
Mr. William N. Morell, Special  
Assistant to the Secretary on National  
Security, Department of the Treasury  
LTG John H. Elder, J-5 (Plans and  
Policy), JCS  
Mr. Richard Ober, NSC Staff, Executive  
Secretary of the NSCIC

Others present: VAdm Earl F. Rectanus, with Mr. Ellsworth  
Capt. Gerald W. Dyer, with LTG Elder  
25X1 [redacted] Executive Secretary  
Mr. George A. Carver, Jr., D/DCI/NIO

Agenda Item 1: Briefing on the National Intelligence Officers

1. Mr. George Carver, Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Officers, described the functioning and structure of the NIO organization. He said it represented an effort to cope with the bureaucratic problem of organizing resources against changing problems without a constant reorganization.

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2. Mr. Carver cited CIA efforts to cope with the Southeast Asia problem during the 1960's as an example of an effort to adapt changing problems and organizational responses. He noted Mr. McCone had used a "kitchen cabinet" system of informal advisors on SEA problems. Admiral Raborn sought to establish a line organization, but CIA was not structured to accommodate such. The end result was creation of a staff directly responsible to the DCI and collectively aware of everything CIA was doing, but not disturbing internal lines of authority. This same concept of a corps of senior officers directly responsible to the DCI for estimates was used in setting up the NIOs which Mr. Carver described a "roving linebackers" for the DCI in geographic or topical areas. Dr. Schlesinger, while DCI, laid the basis for the NIO concept; and Mr. Colby brought the organization into being.

3. Each NIO is a counselor/spokesman to both the Community and consumers in his area of responsibility, but has no line authority. The authority of each NIO is derived from his position as advisor to the DCI. Each NIO must be cognizant of intelligence resources in his area, know how these resources can be brought to bear, and serve as DCI spokesman to users. He is expected to be knowledgeable of user needs and of the capabilities of Intelligence Community consumers and producers.

4. Mr. Ellsworth asked if, since each NIO is an individual representative of the DCI, it was expected the NIOs would change whenever a new DCI was appointed.

5. Mr. Carver said, yes, commenting that Mr. Colby's concept is that NIOs should serve a rotational two-year tour to avoid development of a rigid organization.

6. Mr. Carver described the responsibilities of the 11 NIOs now serving and commented on the various intelligence organizations represented as either NIO or Assistant NIO in each area. Mr. Carver emphasized that he was not an administrative buffer or substantive filter for the individual NIOs and the DCI, but sought to serve as a clearinghouse on NIO matters. He personally maintained close contact with officers at the level of Assistant Secretary and above and senior program officials within the Intelligence Community.

7. Mr. Carver described the coordination system used in the development of papers sponsored by the NIOs, emphasizing that while the elaborateness of coordination depends on time availability, the NIOs are charged with seeking to get a product which reflects the best thinking of the Community.

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8. The NIO tool for focusing the Community on major, current concerns, Mr. Carver said, is the KIQs. He noted that in a perfect world the NSC Staff would draft these KIQs, but as a practical matter, the NIOs seek to anticipate the needs of major users and develop the NIOs in concert with Community colleagues. He noted that a "strategy" has been developed by the NIOs and the Community for each of the 69 FY-1975 KIQs, and at the end of the year an after action report will be prepared on how well the Community has done.

9. Commenting on relations with the Intelligence Community Staff, Mr. Carver noted that the IC focuses on resources in a broad sense, and the NIOs on substantive matters, but that there was a "gray area" of common concern since some issues involve both. He considers the present arrangement is working well. The NIO system is still evolutionary, but Mr. Carver feels that it has given the DCI "comfort" about his control over the substantive intelligence output.

10. In response to a suggestion from General Wilson, Mr. Carver described how the topics for estimates are selected and the process by which estimates are produced.

11. He emphasized that although the NIO assumed the Board of National Estimate's functions, the NIOs have a broader scope since BNE was not concerned with collection capabilities.

12. Mr. Carver said that any NSC member or, in practical terms, his senior staff officers or senior intelligence community officers, can request or suggest an NIE topic. It is the NIO role to find out "what does the requester need," and it may not be an NIE. If a formal estimate is to be prepared, the DCI must approve the topic. No formal list of future estimates is developed, but decisions are made on a case-by-case basis.

13. Once the topic has been selected, the NIO selects a chairman (usually not the NIO himself) responsible for the initial draft. The NIO has no line authority, but he can request the head of a production organization to make the desired chairman available. The first draft is a non-institutional product. It belongs to the NIO. Drafters do not "vote the stock" of their parent component. After the draft is approved by the NIO and the chairman, it is circulated to the USIB organizations. A group of representatives considers the draft, and it then goes to the USIB.

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14. Mr. Carver emphasized that considerable effort is taken to avoid masking differences of view. If there are contrary views, these are argued in advocacy form in the text of the estimate. He considers that consumers should be aware if there are clear differences of opinion, but they should not be provided a wide variety of views among which they can make their own selection. What the estimate drafters try to do is focus on true differences and ensure significant differences of opinion are reflected in the document. He noted that in some instances, it has turned out that the institution from which the drafter came did not share the drafter's opinion when the document reached USIB for final consideration.

15. Mr. Morell asked how consumers really use the NIOs. He saw the NIO as responsible for laying out strategy, coordinating requirements, and getting coordination, but this represents only about five percent of Treasury requirements. He said he did not go to the NIO for specific economic information and 95 percent of the Treasury contacts were with intelligence officers responsible for substance. He asked if this was the way the NIO system was expected to work in the future.

16. Mr. Carver replied that a person who knew whom to call could operate as Mr. Morell described, but that any levy on an individual officer is referred to the appropriate NIO. If the NIO considers the wrong office has been contacted or others should be involved, he can move to see to it the request is properly handled. When a consumer has a problem and does not know whom to call, he should contact the NIO.

17. Admiral Rectanus said that OSD officers call the Director, DIA, not an NIO; and if DIA could not handle the problem, it would contact the NIO.

18. Referring to what he called a "continuing, unresolvable problem at USIB," Mr. Carver referred to relations between the NIOs and the military services. He said the NIOs have no desire to intrude on or disrupt the DIA role as head of the military intelligence effort, but when there are problems on which a military service has high expertise, the NIO will not refuse to discuss that matter with the service involved. He admitted this is a "thin wire to walk." If a component is to work on a Community task in which it is expert, the NIO, in Mr. Carver's view, must be able to deal directly with that service.

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19. Mr. Ellsworth said the comments were very helpful. Mr. Ober said the Working Group was trying to involve itself in the substantive Objectives and the KIQs so the group could play a role in assessing and implementing the NIO effort.

20. Mr. Carver said the KIQs were more than a requirements list. The components of the Community need a more definitive focus. He specifically mentioned the need of NSA for authoritative tasking as a basis for its doing one thing and not another. He said the KIQs provided this kind of tasking, but if the system is to be effective, there is a need for an expression from consumers as to what is needed and what can be done without.

Agenda Item 2: Approval of the Minutes of the 20 November Meeting

21. The minutes were approved with inclusion of an amendment to paragraph 64 as proposed by Admiral Rectanus.

22. Mr. Morell noted that at the last meeting he had submitted a list of proposed changes in intelligence products and wondered what had happened. General Wilson said that for the next meeting he proposed to present a work program listing in priority order subjects which should be undertaken in response to the inputs previously made such as those from Mr. Morell. He said the proposed work plan would be disseminated before the next meeting.

Agenda Item 3: Substantive Objectives for the DCI's "Objectives for the Intelligence Community for FY-1976"

23. In accordance with the memorandum sent to members on 16 January enclosing the DCI's substantive objectives for FY-1975, General Wilson asked for suggestions and inputs for a revised and updated set of substantive objectives. He said that if each member focused on one or two objectives close to his area of interest, it might be possible to get agreement at the meeting on a new set of five or six objectives. If the members wished to submit separate lists and agreement was not reached during the meeting, he would assume the task of assembling a final list from the inputs and disseminate it with a request for telephonic concurrence. He said he would like to go to the NSCIC rather soon with a request for concurrence on the new list. General Wilson said that new DCI management objectives for FY-1976 are being developed, and since they will flow in part from the substantive objectives, it was desired to have the new listing of substantive objectives by mid-February.

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24. As a general comment, Mr. Morell said the present substantive objectives used the term "reliable, timely, comprehensive assessments," but the objectives should apply to all kinds of production; and he suggested the word assessments be replaced by "intelligence." He also felt it was important that it be made clear the objectives referred to intelligence relevant to U.S. policy and negotiations and not to basic tomes like the National Intelligence Survey. He suggested the introduction should read, "provide reliable and timely intelligence relevant to U.S. policy and negotiations on the following priority topics."

25. General Wilson called on Mr. Ellsworth, who said he had no comment. Admiral Rectanus said it should be made clear that if the phrase, "policy and negotiations" were used, matters of importance for military operations were not being excluded. He noted "this whole other world exists."

26. Mr. Brown said it was not clear to him what utility these objectives served. Were they for presentation to Congress or for guidance to the Community? Is there an analog to the Defense program and planning documents? He said the present objectives were "all things to all men" and could justify 500 intelligence targets. He did not consider they were useful as a means of identifying where the real intelligence effort should be put. He felt that the first and second sentences of objective two represented entirely different topics. He wondered what the phrase, "political capability to exert influence or power" in objective two really meant.

27. In response to a comment that, as written, the Objectives were not useful to the consumers, Mr. Ober noted that the consumers themselves should write the Objectives which should then be used as a basis for drafting new KIQs.

28. Mr. Carver said the objectives were an attempt by the DCI to focus the Intelligence Community on the five major matters that concern consumers most. He said objectives one and two were deliberately split--the first to apply to political intelligence and the second to military capabilities of the USSR. He noted it would take time to reverse the way requirements have traditionally been viewed; and this is what the Objectives/KIQ process is intended to change. He cited activities of a CIA Station Chief as an example, and Mr. Brown commented that he thought that the existing objectives list would enable a Station Chief to fit anything he is doing into the list.

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29. Mr. Ober said that he considered that consumers must be more active in developing intelligence requirements and that the consumer must drive the requirements process rather than being a passive recipient. Mr. Ellsworth responded that the consumers can focus on the KIQs better than on the Objectives. Mr. Ober then said that was why he felt intelligence consumers should draft the KIQs. Mr. Ober added that he considered NSCIC participation in the formulation of the Objectives to be an important milestone in the development of the role of the consumer in articulating his needs to the Intelligence Community.

30. General Wilson said that the present effort is to simplify the process by identifying the basic consumer needs and intelligence objectives and refining KIQs and other requirements from these objectives.

31. Mr. Ober said there was a need to get the cycle adjusted so that the consumer is in the process earlier and has more time to formulate Objectives and KIQs. He said he had NSC Staff suggestions for revisions of the proposed Objectives and would provide a copy to General Wilson.

32. General Elder also submitted a proposed listing of five tentative objectives, and noted that they turned out to be quite similar to the existing objectives. Mr. Morell submitted a proposed change to objective four noting that the focus should be on crisis situations and not on areas.

33. Mr. Ober said he felt the existing Objectives would hold with amendments but that either a sixth Objective should be added or Number five should be expanded to include specific references to several aspects of the oil problem.

34. General Wilson said he would have the proposals which had been submitted reviewed and would concur with Mr. Carver on development of a revised set to be submitted to the members.

#### Agenda Item 4: The Omnibus NSCID

35. [ ] reported on the status of the omnibus NSCID, on which the NSCIC has tasked the Working Group for a recommendation as soon as USIB coordination is completed. USIB considered the NSCID on 5 December, but since then DIA has proposed additions and a restructuring of the document. The revised draft has not yet been resubmitted to the USIB, but in view of the ongoing investigations of the Intelligence Community, the DCI may well want to have an approved document on hand on short notice. Conversely, the DCI may decide to defer formal submission of the omnibus NSCID to the NSC in the expectation that major changes may be called for in existing NSCIDs, which the omnibus NSCID is intended to replace. [ ] said it was with the first of these situations in mind that the Chairman had considered it appropriate to make the Working Group aware of the current status of the paper.

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36. [ ] listed the only matters in the present draft which had not yet been considered by the USIB as these:

a. The DIA proposal that all intelligence elements of the Defense Department be included under a single paragraph heading--which paragraph would represent about 45 percent of the total length of the paper.

b. A rather detailed treatment of DIA responsibilities internal to the Defense Department.

c. A brief general statement proposed by DIA on the internal intelligence functions of the military departments and services.

d. A revision of materials from the proposed NSCID No. 9 on CIA foreign intelligence operations within the United States and clandestine operations affecting U.S. citizens abroad. The text of NSCID No. 9 is still being drafted.

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37. [ ] suggested that on completion of USIB consideration of the omnibus NSCID, the Working Group task would essentially be to draw two conclusions as the basis for its recommendation:

First, does the omnibus NSCID represent a satisfactory codification of the existing NSCIDs, with appropriate updating to reflect changes in matters which the present eight NSCIDs address, and

Second, is the material which has been added to cover matters not previously addressed in any NSCID appropriate for inclusion in a NSC directive. Assuming the document remains as now drafted, these additions would include material from the proposed NSCID No. 9, a sub-paragraph on national reconnaissance activities, a sub-paragraph on the DIA, a sub-paragraph on the military intelligence services, a paragraph on the Treasury Department and a paragraph on the Energy Resources Development Administration. 25X1

38. If either of these conclusions is negative, [ ] suggested it would be the responsibility of the Working Group to recommend such additional action as it considered appropriate.

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39. General Wilson commented that he saw an anomaly in the Working Group being tasked to review and make a recommendation on an omnibus NSCID which was essentially a management document. He wondered whether the group might want to indicate that it considered the NSCID outside its jurisdiction and suggest that the DCI send the USIB-coordinated document directly to the NSC.

40. Mr. Ober noted that this situation had arisen because the DCI originally had referred the omnibus NSCID to the NSCIC for approval of the concept. Nothing in the NSCIC charter applies to this. He asked whether the Working Group might respond only on those parts of the document which were appropriate to a group of intelligence consumers since, in any event, there would be a NSC staff and Dr. Kissinger position on the paper.

41. General Wilson said this would make the task simpler, and, in response to a question, he replied that production responsibilities were addressed and identified in the document.

42. Mr. Carver said that USIB members may differ on how producer roles are to be defined, in which case there would be a DCI recommendation. Mr. Carver felt that the DCI may consider a document of this kind very useful to him, and even though future legislative actions could require a re-do of the omnibus NSCID, Mr. Carver hoped that would not defer action on the paper.

43. Mr. Ellsworth asked what the impact of the Rockefeller Commission recommendations might be, and Mr. Carver suggested the DCI may or may not want to delay the paper until these recommendations become known.

44. Mr. Ober felt that USIB action should continue, but he wondered about NSC action, in particular since the provisions of NSCID No. 9 would be directly relevant to Rockefeller Commission proceedings.

45. General Wilson said he did not feel these were questions the Group was ready to address.

46. Mr. Ellsworth said the Defense Department was not prepared to move on the draft until two questions had been settled--one involving structure of the document with respect to inclusion of all Defense elements under the Department of Defense, and the other involving the inadequacy of the content with respect to Defense components. [redacted] said that the present re-draft has all Defense elements in a single paragraph and the other DIA inputs had been included exactly as written by DIA, but the DCI reaction to the re-draft had not been obtained.

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47. Mr. Carver said there was need for conceptual clarity as to the responsibilities of the Intelligence Community and the internal responsibilities of Defense components.

48. General Wilson closed the discussion with the comment that responsibility for this was now up to USIB.

49. General Wilson asked if there were any suggestions as to topics for future meetings. He said he wanted to develop a list of projects the Group should address in order of priority. Some matters, he felt, could be handled by briefing papers which could be disseminated, with questions and comments handled at a following meeting. He mentioned three possible projects: (1) a review of national intelligence publications, (2) development of an effective process for obtaining consumer reaction to particular products--he noted the Intelligence Community Staff already was working on this--, and (3) a mechanism for Working Group participation in the Key Intelligence Questions process.

(At this point a copy of the IC Staff study was provided each member.)

50. Mr. Ober said he hoped that the Working Group would form a sub-group for product review, and he would like to discuss how this might be done at the next meeting.

51. Mr. Morell said it would be useful if the group could get an evaluation of where the Congressional Select Committees seem to be heading.

The session adjourned at 1200 hours.

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25X1 57. Mr. Ober said there would be a negative response to this at the NSC staff, where the feeling is that intelligence consumers are responsible for the policy options. What he considered is wanted are longer-range projections of the consequences of alternative political and economic developments abroad.

58. Mr. Morell said that PFIAB had raised the question of the

25X1 [redacted], and he felt that part of this problem arose because people outside the Intelligence Community don't understand how clandestine operations function, and don't appreciate the incremental risk factors.

59. He said that the present biographic intelligence is not as useful as it could be. More attention needs to be given to a foreign official's policy positions, his basic philosophy, and how long he is likely to be around, rather than to how many children he has.

60. Mr. Morell said the Intelligence Community could make better use of the desk-level officials in State and the policy-level Treasury officials. They are doing intelligence work even though it is not called intelligence, and there is need for more consultation and interchange.

61. He commented that problems are caused by delays in input of data from the field because the field wants to submit a completed analysis. He cited the foreign reaction to Secretary Simon's recent speech dealing with the proposed \$25 billion recycling facility, as an example, and said that Treasury still had not heard from the FBIS on this. Treasury Under Secretary had reported from Europe by telephone, however.

62. Mr. Brown said that Dr. Kissinger has been pushing hard on the ambassadors to provide more analytic reporting, and he gets upset at straight factual reporting.

63. Mr. Morell said Treasury's problem is two-fold: It needs to know what is going on as it happens, and it needs an interpretation.

64. The chairman called on Admiral Rectanus, who said his perception and views had been reflected in Mr. Ellsworth's comments. He noted that the support for OSD is the problem of the Director, DIA. If he can't do it, due to circumstances beyond his control and authority, then it becomes a Community problem.

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